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Abstract
An unconventional approach for optimal stopping under model ambiguity is introduced.
Besides ambiguity itself, we take into account how ambiguity-averse an agent is. This inclusion
of ambiguity attitude, via an α-maxmin nonlinear expectation, renders the stopping problem
time-inconsistent. We look for subgame perfect equilibrium stopping policies, formulated as fixed
points of an operator. For a one-dimensional diffusion with drift and volatility uncertainty, we
show that every equilibrium can be obtained through a fixed-point iteration. This allows us
to capture much more diverse behavior, depending on an agent’s ambiguity attitude, beyond
the standard worst-case (or best-case) analysis. In a concrete example of real options valuation
under volatility uncertainty, all equilibrium stopping policies, as well as the best one among
them, are fully characterized. It demonstrates explicitly the effect of ambiguity attitude on
decision making: the more ambiguity-averse, the more eager to stop—so as to withdraw from the
uncertain environment. The main result hinges on a delicate analysis of continuous sample paths
in the canonical space and the capacity theory. To resolve measurability issues, a generalized
measurable projection theorem, new to the literature, is also established.
MSC (2010): 60G40, 93E20, 91G80
Keywords: Time inconsistency, model ambiguity, optimal stopping, ambiguity attitude; mea-
surable projection theorem, real options valuation, equilibrium stopping policies.
1 Introduction
Decision making under model ambiguity (or, uncertainty) has been extensively studied, dominantly
in the worst-case or the best-case scenario: strategies are found to maximize the worst-case, or the
best-case, expected value. In practice, few individuals are so pessimistic (or optimistic) that solely
the least (or the most) favorable situation dictates their behavior. In this paper, a new framework
for handling model ambiguity is introduced: ambiguity attitude of an agent is included as a core
ingredient, leading to a more realistic spectrum of behavior.
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We focus on optimal stopping. Classically, an agent chooses a stopping time τ to maximize his
expected discounted payoff
E
P[e−rτg(Xτ )]. (1.1)
In the face of model ambiguity, the agent, uncertain about the true probability P, can only work
with a collection P of plausible probability measures, or priors, which represent the ambiguity
perceived by the agent. This leads to two types of optimal stopping problems. The first type—the
so-called robust optimal stopping—maximizes the worst-case expected value
inf
P∈P
E
P[e−rτg(Xτ )] (1.2)
through the choice of τ ; see Riedel (2009), Bayraktar and Yao (2011a,b, 2014), Cheng and Riedel
(2013), and Nutz and Zhang (2015), among many others. The second type, on the other hand,
maximizes the best-case expected value
sup
P∈P
E
P[e−rτg(Xτ )]; (1.3)
see e.g. Bayraktar and Yao (2011a,b), Ekren et al. (2014), Belomestny and Kra¨tschmer (2016), and
Bayraktar and Yao (2017).
What is missing in the above literature is the agent’s attitude towards ambiguity. Even with
the same perceived ambiguity P, different agents may have different levels of ambiguity aversion,
as shown empirically in Curley and Yates (1989) and Heath and Tversky (1991). To accommo-
date ambiguity attitude, we incorporate the α-maxmin preference, introduced in Ghirardato et al.
(2004), into the optimal stopping framework: the agent intends to maximize
α inf
P∈P
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )] + (1− α) sup
P∈P
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )], (1.4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a given constant that reflects the level of ambiguity aversion of the agent. Here,
both ambiguity and ambiguity attitude are captured, by P and α, respectively. The case α = 1
amounts to the standard worst-case analysis, reflecting extreme aversion to ambiguity. The other
extreme α = 0 depicts a purely ambiguity-loving agent who cares only about the best-case value.
The goal of this paper is to investigate stopping behavior under the α-maxmin objective (1.4).
A distinctive challenge in solving (1.4) is time inconsistency: an optimal strategy we find today
may no longer be optimal at future dates. That is, our future selves may very well deviate from
the optimal strategy we set out to employ today. Consequently, finding an optimal stopping time,
the ultimate goal in the standard literature, is not meaningful here.
Note that neither the classical problem (1.1) nor the worst-case and best-case problems (1.2)
and (1.3) suffers the issue of time inconsistency. Indeed, time consistency of (1.1) simply boils down
to the tower property of conditional expectations. While time consistency is generally in question
under nonlinear expectations, Epstein and Schneider (2003) show that, for the special cases (1.2)
and (1.3), tower property still holds if the set of priors is rectanguler, i.e., stable under pasting condi-
tional distributions. Similar stability conditions are discovered independently, and further refined
under great generality, in the literature of mathematical finance; see e.g. Nutz and van Handel
(2013), Bayraktar and Yao (2014), Ekren et al. (2014), and Nutz and Zhang (2015). All the devel-
opments ensure certain tower property for the nonlinear expectation (1.2) or (1.3), so that time
consistency follows. By contrast, an α-maxmin objective, such as (1.4), does not uphold time
consistency, even when the priors are stable under pasting. This is demonstrated in Section 7 of
Schro¨der (2011) and Section 2 of Beissner et al. (2016). Time inconsistency is a genuine difficulty
for (1.4).
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As proposed in Strotz (1955), a sensible way to deal with time inconsistency is consistent
planning: knowing that his future selves may overturn his current plan, the agent selects the best
present action taking the future disobedience as a constraint. Assuming that every future self will
reason in the same way, the resulting strategy is a (subgame perfect) equilibrium, from which no
future self has incentive to deviate. How such strategies can be precisely formulated and obtained
has been a long-standing problem. In response to this, Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018) develop an
iterative approach to finding equilibria for time-inconsistent stopping problems. It has been applied
to stopping under non-exponential discounting (Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018), Huang and Zhou
(2019, 2017)) and probability distortion (Huang, Nguyen-Huu and Zhou (2018)).
In this paper, we extend the framework of Huang and Zhou (2017) to account for the α-maxmin
objective (1.4). Equilibrium stopping policies are characterized as fixed-points of an operator Θ,
defined in (2.13) below. The central question is whether equilibria can be found via fixed-point
iterations. We take up a strong formulation of model ambiguity, where the drift and volatility
coefficients of a one-dimensional diffusion X are only assumed to satisfy certain Lipschitz and linear
growth conditions, and are otherwise unknown. As shown in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.1, the resulting
collection of priors P is relatively compact and X is a regular diffusion under any P ∈ P. The
regularity of X immediately yields the convergence of any fixed-point iteration; see Proposition 3.1.
To show that the limit of a fixed-point iteration is indeed an equilibrium, appropriate convergence of
stopping times and the values at stopping, uniform in P ∈ P, is required. Such uniform convergence
is carefully established in Lemma 3.3, relying crucially on both the relative compactness of P and
the regularity of X. All this leads to Theorem 3.1, the main result of this paper: every equilibrium
can be found via a fixed-point iteration.
Our framework, in particular, sheds new light on real options valuation. The essence of real
options valuation is the use of risk-neutral pricing techniques to evaluate the right, but not the
obligation, to undertake certain capital investment project. By nature, real options valuation may
suffer model ambiguity more severely than pricing a typical financial option: as the underlying asset
of a real option is mostly neither tradable nor fully observable, finding a risk-neutral measure relies
largely on an agent’s estimate. This often leads to a collection of plausible risk-neutral measures
and a corresponding interval of plausible values of a real option. By incorporating the α-maxmin
preference, the multiple plausible values turns into a single one, i.e., the convex combination of
the least and the best values, as in (1.4). This facilitates decisions making: one compares this
single value and the value of immediate stopping, to decide whether a project should be postponed
or initiated. While the involved stopping problem is now time-inconsistent, the methodology we
develop comes into play to locate (time-consistent) equilibrium strategies.
In particular, in the uncertain volatility model introduced by Avellaneda et al. (1995) and Lyons
(1995), when the payoff function of a real option is of the put option type, we provide complete
characterizations of not only all the equilibrium strategies, but also the best one among them; see
Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.1. It demonstrates explicitly the effect of ambiguity attitude: the
more ambiguity-averse, the more eager to stop—so as to withdraw from the uncertain environment.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that resolves the time-inconsistent stopping
problem under the α-maxmin preference1. This allows us to go beyond the standard worst-case
(or best-case) analysis under model ambiguity, and capture a more realistic spectrum of behavior.
We stress that our collection of priors P is only assumed to be measurable; the “stable under
1There is a related stopping problem, with drift uncertainty only, introduced in Schro¨der (2011) under the α-
maxmin preference. However, due to the time inconsistency involved, the stopping problem was not solved therein,
except for the extreme cases α = 1 and α = 0 (i.e., the usual worst case and best case again).
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pasting” condition, imposed widely in the literature, is not required.
(ii) Whereas time-inconsistent stopping behavior has been widely investigated, it has been ascribed
mostly to non-exponential discounting or probability distortion; see e.g., Grenadier and Wang
(2007), Barberis (2012), Xu and Zhou (2013), and Ebert and Strack (2015), among many others.
This paper enriches research on time-inconsistent stopping, by focusing on ambiguity aversion, a
cause of time inconsistency that has only been slightly discussed in the literature.
(iii) Our framework provides a new approach for real options valuation. Taking ambiguity attitude
into account, via the α-maxmin preference, facilitates decision making under model ambiguity (as
discussed above), but it also renders the stopping problem time-inconsistent. The methodology
we develop particularly resolves this time-inconsistent problem, allowing us to take full advantage
of including ambiguity attitude in decision making.
(iv) Extending the iterative approach from Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018) to our multiple-prior set-
ting is nontrivial. It demands several convergence results related to stopping times, uniform
across all priors, which are established by a detailed analysis of sample paths and a careful use
of the capacity theory; see Lemma 3.3 and its proof in Appendix A.
Moreover, a new measurable projection theorem (Theorem 5.1 below) is established. Classical
measurable projection theorems all require one of the spaces involved to be a Borel space endowed
with the Borel σ-algebra. By contrast, Theorem 5.1 allows for any general measurable spaces. In
our multiple-prior setting, for the fixed-point operator Θ to be well-defined, Borel measurability,
used in the single-prior framework of Huang et al. (2018) and Huang and Zhou (2017), is no
longer adequate, and the more general universal measurability is needed; see Proposition 2.1. In
particular, showing that (1.4) is universally measurable demands Theorem 5.1, which does not
require specific Borel structure; see Lemma 2.2 and Remark 2.2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general set-up, includ-
ing the formulations of the time-inconsistent stopping problem under model ambiguity and the
corresponding fixed-point operator. In Section 3, under both drift and volatility uncertainty of a
one-dimensional diffusion, we show that every equilibrium stopping policy is the limit of a fixed-
point iteration. Section 4 applies our theoretic results to a concrete real options valuation problem;
all equilibrium stopping policies, and the best one among them, are explicitly characterized. Sec-
tion 5 is devoted to the derivation of a new, generalized measurable projection theorem, which is
required in Section 2. Appendix A presents the technical proof of Lemma 3.3.
2 The Set-up
For any Polish space M , we denote by B(M) the Borel σ-algebra of M , and by U(M) the σ-algebra
consisting of all universally measurable sets in M . Let P(M) be the set of all probability measures
on (M,B(M)). Each P ∈ P(M) can be uniquely extended to U(M), and we do not distinguish
between P and its extension throughout this paper.
Consider the canonical space Ω := C([0,∞);Rd). For each t > 0, we define Ωt := C([0, t];R
d).
Let B denote the canonical process Bt(ω) := ωt for all ω ∈ Ω, and let F
B = (FBt )t≥0 be the natural
filtration generated by B. Recall that
FBt = B(Ωt) ∀t ≥ 0 and F
B
∞ = B(Ω). (2.1)
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For each P ∈ P(Ω), let FP = (FPt )t≥0 be the P-augmentation of F
B. We then define the universal
filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 by
Ft :=
⋂
P∈P(Ω)
FPt , ∀t ≥ 0.
Note that F is right-continuous, thanks to the right-continuity of FP for all P ∈ P(Ω). Moreover,
Ft = U(Ωt) ∀t ≥ 0 and F∞ = U(Ω). (2.2)
We denote by T the set of all F-stopping times.
Let us introduce a general, albeit time-homogeneous, formulation of model ambiguity. For any
x ∈ Rd, consider
Ωx := {ω ∈ Ω : ω0 = x},
and let
P(x) ⊆ {P ∈ P(Ω) : P(Ωx) = 1 and B is strong Markov under P} (2.3)
denote the set of priors of an agent at the state x ∈ Rd. That is, every P ∈ P(x) is believed by
the agent to be a possibly true description of how the process B will evolve, given that its current
value is x ∈ Rd. Note that P(x) is not necessarily dominated by some reference probability P∗ with
respect to which all P ∈ P(x) are absolutely continuous. In other words, some elements in P(x)
may be mutually singular, which in particular covers the case of volatility uncertainty in a diffusion
model of B; see Section 4 for a detailed example.
2.1 The α-maxmin Objective
Consider a payoff function g : Rd → R. An agent, with discount rate r > 0, intends to maximize
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )] by choosing an appropriate τ ∈ T , subject to the uncertainty P ∈ P(x) at the
current state x ∈ Rd. Such a stopping problem has been substantially studied, yet almost always
in the worst-case (or best-case) scenario. Stated in the current setting, the literature is focused on
finding τ∗ ∈ T that maximizes the worst-case (or best-case) value, i.e.,
inf
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )] or sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )]. (2.4)
A large number of references can be found in the introduction.
Practical decision making, however, is much more complicated than the worst-case (or best-
case) analysis. What is missing in (2.4) is the agent’s attitude towards ambiguity: even with the
same perceived ambiguity P(x), different agents may have different levels of ambiguity aversion.
Indeed, as shown empirically in Curley and Yates (1989) and Heath and Tversky (1991), ambiguity
attitude is heterogeneous among individuals: some can be much less ambiguity-averse than others
under various circumstances. To accommodate ambiguity attitude, a general model of utility max-
imization has been developed in Ghirardato et al. (2004) and Klibanoff et al. (2005). In particular,
the α-maxmin preference, a popular, straightforward version of the general model, stipulates that,
at the current state x ∈ Rd, the agent maximizes
α inf
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )] + (1− α) sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )], (2.5)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a given constant that reflects the level of ambiguity aversion of the agent. Here,
both ambiguity and ambiguity attitude are captured, by P(x) and α, respectively. The case α = 1
(resp. α = 0) corresponds to the standard worst-case (resp. best-case) problem, reflecting extreme
aversion to (resp. desire for) ambiguity. It is the scope of this paper to investigate the diverse
stopping behavior between these two extremes, i.e., for any α ∈ [0, 1].
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2.2 Time Inconsistency
When solving the problem
sup
τ∈T
(
α inf
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )] + (1− α) sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rτg(Bτ )]
)
, (2.6)
the issue of time inconsistency arises: an optimal strategy we find today may no longer be optimal
at future dates. Specifically, suppose an optimal stopping time τ˜x ∈ T exists for (2.6), for all
x ∈ Rd. The problem (2.6) is said to be time-consistent if for any x ∈ Rd and t ≥ 0,
τ˜x(ω) = t+ τ˜Bt(ω) for ω ∈ {τ ≥ t} P-a.s., ∀P ∈ P(x).
If the above condition fails to hold, (2.6) is said to be time-inconsistent.
A critical condition time consistency hinges on is the tower property of conditional expecta-
tions. In the worst case (or best-case) scenario, Epstein and Schneider (2003) shows that time con-
sistency holds if the set of priors is rectanguler, i.e., stable under pasting conditional distributions.
Similar stability conditions are proposed under great generality in the literature of mathemati-
cal finance; see Nutz and van Handel (2013), Bayraktar and Yao (2014), Ekren et al. (2014), and
Nutz and Zhang (2015). The technical endeavor in these works ensures certain tower property of
nonlinear conditional expectations in the form of (2.4), so that time consistency follows.
By contrast, time inconsistency is inherent in (2.6). Even when the priors are stable under
pasting, an α-maxmin objective does not uphold time consistency. This is demonstrated in detail
through an optimal stopping problem in Section 7 of Schro¨der (2011), as well as in a simple two-
period model in Section 2 of Beissner, Lin and Riedel (2016).
To deal with time inconsistency, we follow consistent planning proposed in Strotz (1955): one
takes into account the potential disobedience of his future selves, and selects the best present
action in response to that. If every future self will reason in the same way, the resulting strat-
egy will be a (subgame perfect) equilibrium, from which no future self has incentive to deviate.
How to precisely formulate and locate such strategies has been a long-standing challenge. In the
context of time-inconsistent stopping, Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018) develop a versatile iterative
approach: equilibrium strategies, formulated as fixed points of an operator, can be found con-
veniently via fixed-point iterations. It has been applied successfully to optimal stopping under
non-exponential discounting (Huang and Nguyen-Huu (2018), Huang and Zhou (2019, 2017)) and
probability distortion (Huang, Nguyen-Huu and Zhou (2018)). In this paper, we will extend this
iteration approach further to account for model ambiguity and ambiguity attitude.
2.3 Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
Thanks to the time-homogeneous setup of model ambiguity in (2.3), we can focus on hitting times
to regions in Rd, instead of dealing with all general stopping times. That is, an agent chooses some
R ∈ U(Rd), and stops at the moment
τR := inf{t ≥ 0 : Bt ∈ R}. (2.7)
For convenience, we will often call R ∈ U(Rd) a stopping policy.
It is worth noting that we do not restrict ourselves to Borel measurable or analytic stopping
policies R, but allow for universally measurable ones. Such generality is important to our subsequent
fixed-point formulation, as explained in Remark 2.3 below. With R ∈ U(Rd), the measurability of
τR is nontrivial. Indeed, if we had R ∈ B(R
d), the classical debut theorem (see e.g. Theorem 2.1 in
Bass (2010)) would imply that for any t ≥ 0, {τR ≤ t} ∈ F
P
t for all P ∈ P(Ω), which readily yields
τR ∈ T . As the next result shows, much more care needs to be taken for R ∈ U(R
d).
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Lemma 2.1. For any R ∈ U(Rd), τR in (2.7) belongs to T .
Proof. For each fixed s ≥ 0, ω 7→ Bs(ω) is by definition F
B
s -measurable. Thanks to (2.1) and
Corollary 7.44.1 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978), we have the relation
A ∈ U(Rd) implies (Bs)
−1(A) ∈ U(Ωs) = Fs ⊆ F
P
s for all P ∈ P(Ω), (2.8)
where the equality follows from (2.2).
Fix t > 0, by the right continuity ofB, we can construct, as in Proposition 1.1.13 of Karatzas and Shreve
(1991), a sequence of discretized processes {B(n)}n∈N, which satisfy B
(n)
s (ω) → Bs(ω) for all
(s, ω) ∈ [0, t] × Ω. For each P ∈ P(Ω), by using (2.8), the constructed map (s, ω) 7→ B
(n)
s (ω)
from ([0, t] × Ω,B([0, t]) × FPt ) to (R
d,U(Rd)) is measurable, for all n ∈ N. As n → ∞, we con-
clude that the map (s, ω) 7→ Bs(ω), again from ([0, t] × Ω,B([0, t]) × F
P
t ) to (R
d,U(Rd)), is also
measurable. Given R ∈ U(Rd), it follows that
Γt := {(s, ω) ∈ [0, t)× Ω : Bs(ω) ∈ R} ∈ B([0, t]) ×F
P
t , ∀t ≥ 0 and P ∈ P(Ω). (2.9)
Now, for each P ∈ P(Ω), thanks to Theorem I.4.14 of Revuz and Yor (1999) and (2.9), we have
{τR < t} = projΩ(Γt) ∈ F
P
t , for all t ≥ 0. Thus, {τR < t} ∈
⋂
P∈P(Ω)F
P
t = Ft, for all t ≥ 0. As
F = (Ft)t≥0 is by construction right-continuous, τR is an F-stopping time, i.e., τR ∈ T .
To carry out consistent planning proposed in Strotz (1955), we follow the game-theoretic formu-
lation in Section 2.1 of Huang and Zhou (2017) (in line with Section 3.1 of Huang and Nguyen-Huu
(2018)). Suppose that the agent initially planned to take R ∈ U(Rd) as his stopping policy. Given
the current state x ∈ Rd, the agent carries out the game-theoretic reasoning: “assuming that all
my future selves will follow R ∈ U(Rd), what is the best stopping strategy today in response to
that?” The agent today has only two possible actions: stopping and continuation. If he stops, he
gets g(x) right away; if he continues, given that all his future selves will follow R ∈ U(Rd), he will
eventually stop at the moment
ρR := inf{t > 0 : Bt ∈ R}. (2.10)
Given that the agent’s ambiguity attitude is characterized by α ∈ [0, 1], this leads to the α-maxmin
expected payoff
J(x,R) := α inf
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρRg(BρR)] + (1− α) sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρRg(BρR)]. (2.11)
Remark 2.1. The fact “ρR ∈ T ” can be proved in the same way as in Lemma 2.1. Note the subtle
difference between τR and ρR: the former involves “t ≥ 0”, while the latter “t > 0”. In (2.11), as
this is the case where the agent at x ∈ Rd chooses to continue (without regard to whether x ∈ R),
the stopping time in effect is ρR, not τR.
In (2.11), we allow ρR to take the value ∞: if ρR(ω) =∞, we define
e−rρRg(BρR)(ω) := lim sup
t→∞
e−rtg(Bt)(ω). (2.12)
This is in line with Appendix D of Karatzas and Shreve (1998). Moreover, to ensure that J(x,R)
in (2.11) is well-defined, we impose the following standing assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.1. For any x ∈ Rd,
sup
P∈P(x)
E
P
[
sup
0≤t≤∞
e−rt|g(Bt)|
]
<∞,
where we interpret e−r·∞|g(B∞)| := lim supt→∞ e
−rt|g(Bt)|, similarly to (2.12).
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To find the best stopping policy for today, in response to future selves following R ∈ U(Rd), the
agent simply compares the payoffs g(x) and J(x,R). This leads to
Θ(R) := SR ∪ (IR ∩R), (2.13)
where we define
SR := {x ∈ R
d : g(x) > J(x,R)},
IR := {x ∈ R
d : g(x) = J(x,R)},
CR := {x ∈ R
d : g(x) < J(x,R)}.
(2.14)
Here, SR, IR, and CR are called the stopping region, the indifference region, and the continuation
region, respectively. In particular, on IR, the agent is indifferent between stopping and continuation
as they yield the same payoff. There is then no incentive for the agent to deviate from the original
stopping policy R ∈ U(Rd). This gives rise to the term IR ∩R in (2.13).
2
It is of interest to see whether this new region Θ(R), obtained from the original stopping policy
R ∈ U(Rd), is again a stopping policy, i.e., Θ(R) ∈ U(Rd). In view of (2.14), this boils down to the
universal measurability of x 7→ J(x,R), which will be established in the next result.
Note that the key in the proof below is the use of a non-standard measurable projection theorem
(i.e., Theorem 5.1 below) that does not require Borel structure, as is needed in all classical projection
theorems. Section 5 will be devoted to the derivation of this new measurable projection theorem.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose {(x,P(x)) : x ∈ Rd} ⊆ Rd×P(Ω) is universally measurable and g : Rd → R
is universally measurable. For any R ∈ U(Rd), the functions
x 7→ inf
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρRg(BρR)] and x 7→ sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρRg(BρR)]
are universally measurable.
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, universal measurability of g, and Proposition 7.44 of Bertsekas and Shreve
(1978), the function e−rρRg(BρR), mapping Ω to R, is universally measurable. It follows that
f(P) := EP[e−rρRg(BρR)], viewed as a map from P(Ω) to R, is universally measurable, thanks to
Corollary 7.46.1 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978). For any K ∈ R, this implies that{
P ∈ P(Ω) : EP[e−rρRg(BρR)] < K
}
is universally measurable. Consequently,
A :=
{
(x,P(x)) : x ∈ Rd
}
∩
(
R
d ×
{
P ∈ P(Ω) : EP[e−rρRg(BρR)] < K
})
is universally measurable, thanks to the assumption that
{
(x,P(x)) : x ∈ Rd
}
is universally mea-
surable. Now, observe that{
x ∈ Rd : inf
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρRg(BρR)] < K
}
= projRd(A),
which is universally measurable in Rd, thanks to the generalized measurable projection result
Theorem 5.1. Thus, we conclude that x 7→ infP∈P(x) E
P[e−rρRg(BρR)] is universally measurable. By
a similar argument and the fact that the complement of a universally measurable set is universally
measurable, we obtain that x 7→ supP∈P(x) E
P[e−rρRg(BρR)] is also universally measurable.
2A similar formulation can be found in Section 2.1 of Huang and Zhou (2017).
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Remark 2.2. Classical measurable projection theorems (see e.g. Theorem 2.12 of Crauel (2002) or
Theorem III.23 of Castaing and Valadier (1977)) cannot be applied in the proof above, as they all
require certain Borel measurability, which need not hold in our case. Specifically, to apply classical
theorems,
{
P ∈ P(Ω) : EP[e−rρRg(XρR)] < K
}
needs to be a Borel subset of P(Ω). However, even
for R ∈ B(Rd), ρR in general is only universally measurable; indeed, for any t ≥ 0, {ρR ≤ t} lies
in FPt for all P ∈ P(Ω), but not necessarily in F
B
t . Thus, even with Borel measurable g, it is only
guaranteed that P 7→ EP[e−rρRg(XρR)] is universally measurable, but not Borel measurable.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose {(x,P(x)) : x ∈ Rd} ⊆ Rd × P(Ω) is universally measurable and
g : Rd → R is universally measurable. Then, for any R ∈ U(Rd), Θ(R) ∈ U(Rd).
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, x 7→ J(x,R), defined in (2.11), is universally measurable. This, together
with g being universally measurable, implies that all the sets SR, IR, and CR belong to U(R
d).
Therefore, Θ(R) = SR ∪ (IR ∩R) ∈ U(R
d).
Remark 2.3. If we take R to be a Borel (or analytic) set, it is not guaranteed that Θ(R) is also
Borel (or analytic). Indeed, for any R ∈ B(Rd), as x 7→ J(x,R) is only universally measurable
(recall Remark 2.2), Θ(R) ∈ B(Rd) need not hold. Alternatively, take R to be an analytic set in Rd.
Even if we show that x 7→ J(x,R) is upper (resp. lower) semi-analytic and thus CR (resp. SR) is
analytic, it is unclear if SR (resp. CR) is analytic. Whether Θ(R) is analytic is then in question.
In view of Proposition 2.1, Θ defined in (2.13) can be viewed as an operator acting on U(Rd),
i.e., Θ : U(Rd)→ U(Rd). An equilibrium is then defined as a fixed point of the operator.
Definition 2.1. R ∈ U(Rd) is called an equilibrium if Θ(R) = R. We denote by E the collection
of all equilibria.
Remark 2.4 (Existence of an equilibrium). The entire space Rd is an equilibrium. Indeed, for any
x ∈ Rd, ρRd = 0 and thus J(x,R
d) = g(x). This implies IRd = R
d, so that Θ(Rd) = Rd.
The general methodology for finding equilibria (other than the entire space Rd) is to perform
fixed-point iterations: one starts with an arbitrary R ∈ U(Rd), and apply Θ to it repetitively until
an equilibrium is reached. That is, we take
R∗ := lim
n→∞
Θn(R) (2.15)
as a candidate equilibrium. To make this idea rigorous, we need to show that (i) the above limit-
taking is well-defined, i.e., R∗ ∈ U(R
d), and (ii) R∗ is indeed an equilibrium, i.e., Θ(R∗) = R∗. The
next section focuses on establishing (i) and (ii).
3 Convergence of Fixed-Point Iterations
In this section, under a strong formulation of model ambiguity, we will show that the fixed-point
iteration (2.15) indeed converges to an equilibrium, when the involved state process is a one-
dimensional diffusion. Our analysis crucially relies on the “regular” property of one-dimensional
diffusion processes (i.e., (3.6) below). The multi-dimensional case is left for future research.3
3For a multi-dimensional diffusion process, there is no corresponding notion of being “regular”. As a result, the
analysis in this section does not extend naturally to the multi-dimensional case.
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Take d = 1 in the set-up of Section 2. Let P0 ∈ P(Ω) denote the Wiener measure, under which
B is a standard Brownian motion. Let I = (ℓ, r), for some −∞ ≤ ℓ < r ≤ ∞, be a given interval.
For any x ∈ I, consider the stochastic differential equation
Xx,b,σt = x+
∫ t
0
b(Xx,b,σs )ds +
∫ t
0
σ(Xx,b,σs )dBs ∀0 ≤ t < ζ P0-a.s., (3.1)
where ζ := limn→∞ Sn, with Sn := inf{t > 0 : X
x,b,σ
t /∈ (ℓ+1/n, r−1/n)} for all n ∈ N. We assume
that Xx,b,σ is absorbed at the endpoints of I in the case ζ < ∞. For any y ∈ I and A ∈ U(I), we
introduce the hitting times
T x,b,σy := inf{t > 0 : X
x,b,σ
t = y} and T
x,b,σ
A := inf{t > 0 : X
x,b,σ
t ∈ A}. (3.2)
For simplicity, we will often write X, T xy , and T
x
A for X
x,b,σ, T x,b,σy , and T
x,b,σ
A .
3.1 A Strong Formulation of Model Ambiguity
Let us introduce a subset of {(b, σ) : b, σ maps I to R} that help specify the scope of uncertainty
we would like to deal with.
Definition 3.1. Let L be the collection of functions b, σ : I → R that are Lipschitz continuous and
grows at most linearly on I, with σ2(y) > 0 for all y ∈ I. Moreover,
(i) let A be the collection of all set-valued functions Π : I → 2L;
(ii) let A∞ be the collection of all set-valued functions Π : I → 2L satisfying the following: for
any x ∈ I, there exists K > 0 such that for any (b, σ) ∈ Π(x),
|b(u)− b(v)|+ |σ(u) − σ(v)| ≤ K|u− v| and |b(u)|+ |σ(u)| ≤ K(1 + |u|), ∀u, v ∈ I.
Here, each Π : I → 2L identifies the actual ambiguity faced by the agent, depending on the
current state x ∈ I. That is, Π(x) ⊆ L is the collection of coefficients (b, σ) in (3.1) that are
considered plausible by the agent at x ∈ I.
For each x ∈ I and (b, σ) ∈ L, the Lipschitz and linear growth conditions in Definition 3.1
ensure the existence of a unique strong solution Xx,b,σ to (3.1). By viewing Xx,b,σ as a map from
Ω to itself, we define the probability measure Pxb,σ ∈ P(Ω) by
P
x
b,σ := P0 ◦ (X
x,b,σ)−1. (3.3)
By construction, for any A ⊆ U(Ω),
P
x
b,σ(A) = P0
(
{ω ∈ Ω : Xx,b,σ(ω) ∈ A}
)
. (3.4)
Now, for any x ∈ I, the collection of probabilities associated with L is given by
PL(x) := {P
x
b,σ : (b, σ) ∈ L}.
Similarly, given Π ∈ A, we introduce
P(x) := {Pxb,σ : (b, σ) ∈ Π(x)} ⊆ PL(x), ∀x ∈ I. (3.5)
Two important consequences of Definition 3.1, the regularity of Xx,b,σ and the relative compact-
ness of P(x), are established in Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 below.
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Lemma 3.1. For any x ∈ I and (b, σ) ∈ L, Xx,b,σ is a regular diffusion, i.e.,
for any x ∈ I, P0(T
x
y <∞) > 0, ∀y ∈ I. (3.6)
Proof. Under Definition 3.1, the scale function
s(z) :=
∫ z
x
exp
(
−2
∫ u
x
b(ξ)
σ2(ξ)
dξ
)
du, z ∈ I,
is well-defined, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable. Let q : (s(ℓ), s(r)) → R be
the inverse function of s. By the arguments in Proposition 5.5.13 of Karatzas and Shreve (1991),
X being the unique strong solution to (3.1) entails the existence of a unique strong solution to
dYt = σ˜(Yt)dBt, Y0 = 0, P0-a.s., where σ˜(y) := s
′(q(y))σ(q(y)) for s(ℓ) < y < s(r).
By Theorem 5.5.4 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991) and σ2 > 0 on I, σ˜2 is locally integrable.
Hence, the speed measure m(dy) := 2dy
σ˜2(y) , s(ℓ) < y < s(r), assigns a finite value to any [a, b] ⊂
(s(ℓ), s(r)). This readily implies that Y is a regular diffusion; see Remark (ii), “The converse to
Theorem 47.1”, on p.277 of Rogers and Williams (2000). As X = s−1(Y ), X is also regular.
Te fact that X is a regular diffusion (i.e., satisfying (3.6)) means that I = (ℓ, r) cannot be
decomposed into smaller intervals from which X could not exit. Moreover, when starting with
x ∈ I, X has to enter the regions above and below x immediately, as stated below.
Remark 3.1. For any x ∈ I and (b, σ) ∈ L, T x(ℓ,x) = T
x
(x,r) = T
x
x = 0 P0-a.s. Indeed, Lemma 46.1
(i) in Rogers and Williams (2000) directly gives T x(ℓ,x) = T
x
(x,r) = 0 P0-a.s.; see also the discussion
above Lemma 46.1 therein. Now, for P0-a.e. ω ∈ Ω, the fact P0(T
x
(ℓ,x) = 0) = P0(T
x
(x,r) = 0) = 1
implies that for any n ∈ N, there exist t, t′ ∈ [0, 1/n] such that Xt(ω) > x and Xt′(ω) < x. Hence,
T xx (ω) ≤ 1/n for all n ∈ N, implying T
x
x (ω) = 0.
Corollary 3.1. For any x ∈ I and (b, σ) ∈ L, ρ(ℓ,x) = ρ(x,r) = ρ{x} = 0 P
x
b,σ-a.s.
Proof. Observe from (3.4) that
P
x
b,σ(ρ(ℓ,x) = 0) = P
x
b,σ (inf{t > 0 : Bt ∈ (ℓ, x)} = 0)
= P0
(
inf{t > 0 : Xx,b,σt ∈ (ℓ, x)} = 0
)
= P0(T
x
(ℓ,x) = 0) = 1,
where the last equality follows from Remark 3.1. The same argument shows that Pxb,σ(ρ(x,r) = 0) =
P0(T
x
(x,r) = 0) = 1 and P
x
b,σ(ρ{x} = 0) = P0(T
x
x = 0) = 1.
The following observation will be useful in Section 4.
Remark 3.2. Thanks to Remark 3.1 (or Corollary 3.1), we can follow the arguments in Lemmas
4.1 and 4.2 in Huang and Zhou (2017) to show that for any R ∈ U(I), ρR = ρR P
x
b,σ-a.s., ∀x ∈
I and (b, σ) ∈ L. Consequently, we have SR = SR, IR = IR, and CR = CR. It follows that R ∈ E
if and only if R ∈ E.
Focusing on Π ∈ A∞ yields the relative compactness of P(x).
Lemma 3.2. For any Π ∈ A∞, P(x) is relatively compact for all x ∈ I.
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Proof. Fix x ∈ I. By Theorem 1.3.1 of Stroock and Varadhan (2006), P(x) is relatively compact
if and only if for any ε > 0 and T > 0,
lim
δ↓0
sup
P∈P(x)
P
(
sup
0≤s≤t≤T, t−s<δ
|Bt −Bs| > ε
)
= 0. (3.7)
Thanks to the Lipschitz and linear growth conditions, under the same constant K > 0, in Defini-
tion 3.1 (ii), standard estimations, see e.g. Proposition 1.2.1 in Bouchard (2007), show that there
exist constants β, γ > 0 such that for any (b, σ) ∈ Π(x),
E
P0 [|Xx,b,σt −X
x,b,σ
s |
β ] ≤ CT |t− s|
1+γ , ∀T > 0 and 0 ≤ s, t ≤ T, (3.8)
where CT > 0 depends on only x ∈ I, T > 0, and K > 0. In view of the proof of Theorem I.2.1 in
Revuz and Yor (1999), (3.8) implies that for any η ∈ [0, γ), there exists Cη > 0 such that
E
P0
[
sup
0≤s≤t≤T
|Xx,b,σt −X
x,b,σ
s |β
|t− s|η
]
≤ Cη, ∀(b, σ) ∈ Π(x).
This, together with the Markov inequality, shows that for any P ∈ P(x),
P
(
sup
0≤s≤t≤T, t−s<δ
|Bt −Bs| > ε
)
≤ ε−βEP
[
sup
0≤s≤t≤T, t−s<δ
|Bt −Bs|
β
]
= ε−βEP0
[
sup
0≤s≤t≤T, t−s<δ
|Xx,b,σt −X
x,b,σ
s |
β
]
≤ ε−βCηδ
η,
which readily yields (3.7).
3.2 The Main Result
Corollary 3.1 facilitates the convergence of the fixed-point iteration (2.15), as the next result shows.
Recall that for any Π ∈ A, P(x) is defined as in (3.5).
Proposition 3.1. Fix Π ∈ A such that {(x,P(x)) : x ∈ I} ⊆ I ×P(Ω) is universally measurable.
Then, for any R ∈ U(I), R ⊆ Θ(R). Hence, R∗ in (2.15) is well-defined, and of the form
R∗ =
⋃
n∈N
Θn(R) ∈ U(I).
Remark 3.3. Assuming universal measurability of {(x,P(x)) : x ∈ I} in I×P(Ω) is not restrictive
in terms of the related literature. Such a set is typically assumed to be analytic (and thus univer-
sally measurable) in the more general path-dependent setting; see e.g., Neufeld and Nutz (2013),
Nutz and van Handel (2013), and Biagini et al. (2017).
Proof. Fix R ∈ U(I). For any x ∈ R, we claim that ρR = 0 P
x
b,σ-a.s. for all (b, σ) ∈ Π(x). There are
three cases: (i) if x is an interior point of R, the claim trivially holds; (ii) if x is a boundary point
of R, note that ρ(ℓ,x) = ρ(x,r) = 0 P
x
b,σ-a.s. (by Corollary 3.1) readily implies ρR = 0 P
x
b,σ-a.s., for
all (b, σ) ∈ Π(x); (iii) if x is an isolated point of R, note that ρ{x} = 0 P
x
b,σ-a.s. (by Corollary 3.1)
and the fact x ∈ R readily imply ρR = 0 P
x
b,σ-a.s., for all (b, σ) ∈ Π(x). With ρR = 0 P
x
b,σ-a.s. for
all (b, σ) ∈ Π(x), we have J(x,R) = g(x), i.e. x ∈ IR. Hence, we conclude R ⊆ IR, which gives
Θ(R) = SR ∪ (IR ∩R) = SR ∪R ⊇ R. This, together with Proposition 2.1, shows that {Θ
n(R)}n∈N
is an nondecreasing sequence of sets in U(I), leading to the last assertion.
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The remaining question is whether the limit R∗ of the fixed-point iteration (2.15) is indeed an
equilibrium. To answer this, we need the following technical result, which requires Π ∈ A∞.
Lemma 3.3. For any nondecreasing sequence {Rn}n∈N in U(I), set R0 :=
⋃
n∈NRn and let ρ
n and
ρ0 denote the hitting times ρRn and ρR0 , defined in (2.10), respectively. Then, for any x ∈ I,
ρn(ω) ↓ ρ0(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ωx. (3.9)
Furthermore, for any Π ∈ A∞ and ε > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
sup
P∈P(x)
P
(∣∣ρn − ρ0∣∣ ≥ ε) = 0, (3.10)
lim
n→∞
sup
P∈P(x)
P
(∣∣Bρn −Bρ0∣∣ 1{ρn<∞} ≥ ε) = 0. (3.11)
Remark 3.4. In (3.10), ρn and ρ0 may take the value∞. In particular, on {ρ0 =∞}, ρn = ρ0 =∞
and we define ρn−ρ0 = 0, for all n ∈ N. This is consistent with (2.12), where we do not distinguish
between any two stopping times when they both take the value ∞.
The proof of Lemma 3.3, relying crucially on both the relative compactness of P(x) and the
regularity of Xx,b,σ, is relegated to Appendix A.
Now, we are ready to present the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.1. Fix Π ∈ A∞ such that {(x,P(x)) : x ∈ I} ⊆ I ×P(Ω) is universally measurable.
Suppose that g : I → R is continuous and
lim
t→∞
e−rtg(Xx,b,σt ) = 0 P0-a.s., ∀x ∈ I and (b, σ) ∈ Π(x). (3.12)
Then, for any R ∈ U(I), R∗ defined in (2.15) belongs to E. Hence,
E =
{
lim
n→∞
Θn(R) : R ∈ U(I)
}
. (3.13)
Proof. Fix R ∈ U(I), and consider R∗ defined in (2.15). Recall from Proposition 3.1 that Rn :=
Θn(R), n ∈ N ∪ {0}, form a nondecreasing sequence in U(I) and R∗ =
⋃
n∈NRn. We will denote
by ρn and ρ∗ the hitting times ρRn and ρR∗ , defined in (2.10), respectively.
To show R∗ ∈ E , i.e., Θ(R∗) = R∗, we first note that it suffices to prove SR∗ ⊆ R∗. This is
because Θ(R∗) = SR∗ ∪ R∗, thanks to the proof of Proposition 3.1. To this end, foy any x /∈ R∗,
we aim to show that x /∈ SR∗ . As R∗ =
⋃
n∈NRn, we have x /∈ Rn = Θ
n(R) for all n ∈ N. In view
of (2.13) and (2.14), this implies
J(x,Rn−1) = J(x,Θ
n−1(R)) ≥ g(x), ∀n ∈ N. (3.14)
If we can show that
J(x,R∗) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
J(x,Rn), (3.15)
we immediately obtain J(x,R∗) ≥ g(x) from (3.14), and thus x /∈ SR∗ , as desired. The rest of the
proof focuses on deriving (3.15).
First, let us consider
p := sup{y ∈ R∗ : y < x} and q := inf{y ∈ R∗ : y > x},
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where we take p = ℓ (resp. q = r) if there is no y < x (resp. y > x) lying in R0. Similarly, we
define
pn := sup{y ∈ Rn : y < x} and qn := inf{y ∈ Rn : y > x}, ∀n ∈ N.
As R∗ =
⋃
n∈NRn and {Rn}n∈N is nondecreasing, we have pn ↑ p and qn ↓ q. For the case where
pn = p and qn = q for n large enough, ρ
n = ρ0 on Ωx, and thus J(x,Rn) = J(x,R
∗), for all n large
enough. That is, (3.15) holds trivially. Hence, in the rest of the proof, we assume that pn is strictly
increasing, or qn is strictly decreasing.
Take η > 0, and choose n∗ ∈ N such that max{|pn − p|, |qn − q|} < η for all n ≥ n
∗. Note that
there exists M > 0 such that
e−rρ
n
|g(Bρn)| < M, ∀n ≥ n
∗, P-a.s., for all P ∈ P(x). (3.16)
Indeed, for any n ≥ n∗, if ρn = ∞, e−rρ
n
g(Bρn) = 0 P-a.s. thanks to (3.12); for all n ≥ n
∗ such
that ρn <∞, as Bρn takes values on ([p− η, p]∪ [q, q+ η])∩ I, the continuity of g yields the desired
boundedness. Thus, by the dominated convergence theorem and (3.9),
lim
n→∞
E
P[e−rρ
n
g(Bρn)] = E
P[e−rρ
∗
g(Bρ∗)], ∀P ∈ P(x). (3.17)
On the other hand, by the definition of J in (2.11), (3.14) implies that for any P ∈ P(x),
αEP[e−rρ
n
g(Bρn)] + (1− α) sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρ
n
g(Bρn)] ≥ J(x,Rn) ≥ g(x), ∀n ∈ N.
As n→∞, we deduce from (3.17) that
α inf
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρ
∗
g(Bρ∗)] + (1− α) lim inf
n→∞
sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρ
n
g(Bρn)] ≥ g(x).
Hence, to prove (3.15), it remains to show that
sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρ
∗
g(Bρ∗)] ≥ lim inf
n→∞
sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρ
n
g(Bρn)]. (3.18)
Thanks to (3.12), for any n ≥ n∗,∣∣∣e−rρng(Bρn)− e−rρ∗g(Bρ∗)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣e−rρng(Bρn)− e−rρ∗g(Bρ∗)∣∣∣ 1{ρ∗<∞}
≤
(
e−rρ
n
|g(Bρn)− g(Bρ∗)| 1{ρn<∞} + |g(Bρ∗)||e
−rρ∗ − e−rρ
n
|
)
1{ρ∗<∞}
≤ κ
(
|Bρn −Bρ∗ |1{ρn<∞}
)
+C(ρn − ρ∗),
where κ : R+ → R+ is a modulus of continuity of g on the domain ([p − η, p] ∪ [q, q + η]) ∩ I,
and C > 0 is a constant independent of n, thanks to the boundedness of g(Bρ∗) and the Lipschitz
continuity of x 7→ e−rx on [0,∞). Fix ε > 0. Take δ > 0 such that κ(z) < ε/2 for z < δ. Then,
P
(∣∣∣e−rρng(Bρn)− e−rρ∗g(Bρ∗)∣∣∣ ≥ ε)
≤ P
(
κ
(
|Bρn −Bρ∗ |1{ρn<∞}
)
+ C(ρn − ρ∗) ≥ ε
)
≤ P
(
|Bρn −Bρ∗ |1{ρn<∞} ≥ δ
)
+ P
(
ρn − ρ∗ ≥
ε
2C
)
, ∀P ∈ P(x).
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By (3.10) and (3.11), this implies
lim
n→∞
sup
P∈P(x)
P
(∣∣∣e−rρng(Bρn)− e−rρ∗g(Bρ∗)∣∣∣ ≥ ε) = 0. (3.19)
That is, e−rρ
n
g(Bρn) converges to e
−rρ∗g(Bρ∗) in capacity, in the sense of Definition 3.4 of Cohen et al.
(2011). Now, by Theorem 3.2 in Cohen et al. (2011), (3.19) and (3.16) together imply
lim
n→∞
sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρ
n
g(Bρn)] = sup
P∈P(x)
E
P[e−rρ
∗
g(Bρ∗)].
Then, (3.15) is verified, which completes the proof.
4 Application to Real Options Valuation
Coined by Myers (1977) and popularized by McDonald and Siegel (1986), real options valuation
refers to applying financial option pricing techniques to corporate investment decision making. The
essence is the use of risk-neutral pricing to evaluate the right, but not the obligation, to undertake
certain business plan, such as initiating, abandoning, expanding, or contracting a capital investment
project. Traditionally, this boils down to an optimal stopping problem under a risk-neutral measure,
whose solution dictates optimal timing or scheduling of investment outlays.
By nature, real options valuation may suffer model ambiguity more severely than pricing a
typical financial option: as the underlying asset of a real option is mostly neither tradable nor
fully observable, finding a risk-neutral measure relies largely on an agent’s estimate and belief.
This often leads to a collection of plausible risk-neutral measures and a corresponding interval of
plausible values of a real option.
How to deal with these multiple values is unclear in the literature. Standard investment models
assume that agents are completely ambiguity-averse, considering solely the worst case, i.e., the least
value of the real option; see e.g., Nishimura and Ozaki (2007), Trojanowska and Kort (2010), and
Miao and Wang (2011). On the other hand, many empirical studies, including Heath and Tversky
(1991) and Bhide´ (1999), suggest heterogeneous ambiguity attitude, towards the same investment
opportunities, among investors—some can be quite ambiguity-loving.
In this section, we incorporate the α-maxmin preference into real options valuation. This
yields an immediate benefit: α ∈ [0, 1], which measures an agent’s ambiguity aversion, turns the
multiple values of a real option into one, i.e., the convex combination of the least and the best
values, weighted by α and 1 − α, respectively. There is, however, a downside of it: the decision
making problem now becomes time-inconsistent. Note that a related stopping problem under the
α-maxmin preference was introduced, but not solved, in Schro¨der (2011), precisely because of the
time inconsistency involved. In contrast to this, we will resolve a practical real options valuation
problem under the α-maxmin preference, on strength on the developments in Section 2 and 3: all
equilibria, as well as the best one among them, will be fully characterized.
Specifically, we take the payoff function of the real option to be g(x) := (K − x)+ for some
given K > 0. The underlying asset X is taken as a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.,
Xx,b,σt = x+
∫ t
0
bXx,b,σs ds+
∫ t
0
σXx,b,σs dBs, ∀t ≥ 0, P0-a.s., (4.1)
for some b ∈ R and σ > 0, yet an investor is uncertain about the true values of b and σ. We also
assume that there is a known riskfree rate r > 0. Recall that risk-neutral pricing stipulates that
(i) the discount rate employed should be the riskfree rate r > 0; (ii) under a risk-neutral measure,
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X should follow the dynamics (4.1) with b = r. Hence, for real options valuation, drift uncertainty
does not play a role, as we always take b = r. Volatility uncertainty, on the other hand, gives rise to
a collection of plausible risk-neutral measures: similarly to (3.3), each plausible σ > 0 corresponds
to Pxσ := P0 ◦ (X
x,r,σ)−1.
Following the uncertain volatility model in Avellaneda et al. (1995) and Lyons (1995), we assume
that σ ≤ σ ≤ σ, for some known constants 0 < σ < σ. In view of the setup in Sections 2 and 3, we
have I = (0,∞) and the expected payoff (2.11) now takes the form
J(x,R) = α inf
σ∈[σ,σ]
E
P0
[
e−rTR(K −Xx,r,σTR )
+
]
+ (1− α) sup
σ∈[σ,σ]
E
P0
[
e−rTR(K −Xx,r,σTR )
+
]
, (4.2)
where TR is defined similarly to (3.2) as TR := inf{t > 0 : X
x,r,σ
t ∈ R}.
Our goal is to characterize all (closed) equilibria R, and find the best one Rˆ among them; recall
from Remark 3.2 that it suffices to focus on closed equilibria in the current setting. To this end,
we need to first introduce an optimality criterion for an equilibrium. For any R ∈ E , we define
V (x,R) := g(x) ∨ J(x,R), ∀x ∈ I.
Definition 4.1. Rˆ ∈ E is called an optimal equilibrium, if for any R ∈ E, we have
V (x, Rˆ) ≥ V (x,R), ∀x ∈ I.
This criterion, introduced in Huang and Zhou (2019), is rather strong: it requires a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium to dominate any other equilibrium on the entire state space. For stopping
problems under non-exponential discounting, Huang and Zhou (2019) and Huang and Zhou (2017)
establish the general existence of an optimal equilibrium, when the discount function induces de-
creasing impatience. In an example of optimal stopping under probability distortion, Huang et al.
(2018) derive an optimal equilibrium; see Section 4.3 therein. For the current real options valuation
problem under model ambiguity, we will show that an optimal equilibrium also exists.
Let us start with characterizing equilibria that are contained in (0,K]. It will be shown in the
end that this focus on (0,K] is not restrictive at all.
Lemma 4.1. For any R ∈ E that is closed and contained in (0,K], R = (0, a] for some a ∈ (0,K].
Proof. Define a := sup{x : x ∈ R} ≤ K. By contradiction, suppose that there exists x ∈ (0, a)
such that x /∈ R. Consider
p := sup{y ∈ R : y < x} and q := inf{y ∈ R : y > x}, (4.3)
where the supremum is taken to be 0 if there exists no y ∈ R such that y < x. By the closedness
of R, we have p < x < q and hence ρR > 0 P0-a.s. In view of (4.2), this implies
J(x,R) < α inf
σ∈[σ,σ]
E
P0 [K −Xx,r,σTR ] + (1− α) sup
σ∈[σ,σ]
E
P0 [K −Xx,r,σTR ]
= α inf
σ∈[σ,σ]
(
K − EP0[Xx,r,σTR ]
)
+ (1− α) sup
σ∈[σ,σ]
(
K − EP0 [Xx,r,σTR ]
)
≤ α(K − x) + (1− α)(K − x) = K − x = g(x), (4.4)
where the last inequality follows from Xx,r,σ being a P0-submartingale for all σ ≤ σ ≤ σ, as r > 0.
It follows that x ∈ SR, a contradiction to R being an equilibrium.
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To obtain the converse of Lemma 4.1—for which a > 0 the set R = (0, a] is an equilibrium—
requires a detailed analysis on the map x 7→ J(x, (0, a]). For each a ∈ (0,K), we define
Λ(x, a) := J(x, (0, a])
= (K − a)
(
α inf
σ∈[σ,σ]
E
P0
[
e−rT
x,r,σ
a
]
+ (1− α) sup
σ∈[σ,σ]
E
P0
[
e−rT
x,r,σ
a
])
, for a ≤ x <∞,
where T x,r,σa is defined similarly to (3.2) as
T x,r,σa := inf{t > 0 : X
x,r,σ
t = a}. (4.5)
Thanks to the formula on p.628 of Borodin and Salminen (2002),
E
P0
[
e−rT
x,r,σ
a
]
=
(a
x
)√( r
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2r
σ2
+ r
σ2
− 1
2
=
(a
x
) 2r
σ2 .
It follows that
Λ(x, a) = (K − a)
(
α
(a
x
) 2r
σ2 + (1− α)
(a
x
) 2r
σ2
)
, for a ≤ x <∞, (4.6)
Let us define
m1 :=
2r
σ2
, m2 :=
2r
σ2
, and a∗ :=
m1α+m2(1− α)
1 +m1α+m2(1− α)
K ∈ (0,K). (4.7)
The next result collects useful properties of Λ(x, a).
Lemma 4.2. The function Λ : {(x, a) ∈ (0,∞)×(0,K] : x > a} → R in (4.6) satisfies the following
properties. First, for any a ∈ (0,K),
(i) x 7→ Λ(x, a) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex on (a,∞), with Λ(a, a) = K − a and
limx→∞Λ(x, a) = 0;
(ii) if a < a∗, the two functions x 7→ Λ(x, a) and x 7→ (K − x)+ intersect exactly once at some
x∗ ∈ (a,K), with Λ(x, a) < (K − x)+ on (a, x∗) and Λ(x, a) > (K − x)+ on (x∗,∞);
(iii) if a ≥ a∗, then Λ(x, a) > (K − x)+ on (a,∞).
Moreover, for any x ≥ a∗,
(iv) a 7→ Λ(x, a) is strictly decreasing on (a∗, x ∧K).
Proof. It can be checked directly from (4.6) that (i) holds. For (ii) and (iii), it suffices to check
the slope of Λ(x, a) at x = a. Because
lim
x↓a
Λx(x, a) = lim
x↓a
−
K − a
x
(
m1α
(a
x
)m1
+m2(1− α)
(a
x
)m2)
= −
K − a
a
(m1α+m2(1− α)) ,
we have limx↓a Λx(x, a) < −1 if and only if a < a
∗. Now, with the properties in (i), if a < a∗,
limx↓a Λx(x, a) < −1 implies that Λ(x, a) intersects (K − x)
+ exactly once at some x∗ ∈ (a,K); if
a ≥ a∗, limx↓aΛx(x, a) ≥ −1 implies that Λ(x, a) is always above (K − x)
+ on (a,∞).
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To prove (iv), fix x ≥ a∗. In view of (4.6), for any a ∈ (a∗, x ∧K),
Λa(x, a) = −
1
a
[
(1− α)
(
a−m2(K − a)
) (a
x
)m2
+ α
(
a−m1(K − a)
) (a
x
)m1]
. (4.8)
As a > a∗,
a−m2(K − a) ≥
(m1α+m2(1− α))K −m2(K − a)(1 +m1α+m2(1− α))
1 +m1α+m2(1− α)
≥
(m1α+m2(1− α))K −m2K
1 +m1α+m2(1− α)
=
α(m1 −m2)K
1 +m1α+m2(1− α)
, (4.9)
where the second line follows from (m1α+m2(1− α))K ≤ (1 +m1α+m2(1− α))a, equivalent to
a > a∗. A similar calculation yields
a−m1(K − a) ≥
(m1α+m2(1− α))K −m1K
1 +m1α+m2(1− α)
≥
−(1− α)(m1 −m2)K
1 +m1α+m2(1− α)
. (4.10)
By (4.9) and (4.10), (4.8) leads to
Λa(x, a) ≤ −
α(1− α)(m1 −m2)K
a(1 +m1α+m2(1 − α))
[(a
x
)m2
−
(a
x
)m1]
.
Recalling thatm1 > m2 > 0 and
a
x
< 1 for a ∈ (a∗, x∧K), the above inequality implies Λa(x, a) < 0,
as desired.
A complete characterization of closed equilibria contained in (0,K] can now be established.
Proposition 4.1. E(0,K] := {(0, a] : a
∗ ≤ a ≤ K} is the collection of all closed equilibria contained
in (0,K]. Moreover, Rˆ := (0, a∗] is optimal among E(0,K].
Proof. In view of Lemma 4.1, to prove the first assertion, it suffices to show that (0, a] ∈ E if and
only if a ≥ a∗. Observe that (0, a] ∈ E if and only if J(x, (0, a]) ≥ g(x) = (K − a)+ for all x > a.
As J(x, (0, a]) = Λ(x, a), Lemma 4.2 asserts that this holds if and only if a ≥ a∗.
Take an arbitrary R = (0, a] ∈ E(0,K], with a > a
∗. By definition, Rˆ := (0, a∗] satisfies
J(x, Rˆ) = K − x = J(x,R) for all x ∈ (0, a∗]. For any a∗ < x ≤ a, Lemma 4.2 (iii) implies
J(x, Rˆ) = Λ(x, a∗) > K − x = J(x,R). For any x > a, Lemma 4.2 (iv) implies J(x, Rˆ) =
Λ(x, a∗) > Λ(x, a) = J(x,R). Hence, we conclude that J(x, Rˆ) ≥ J(x,R) for all x ∈ I, and thus
V (x, Rˆ) ≥ V (x,R) for all x ∈ I.
Now, we show that focusing on equilibria contained in (0,K] is by no means restrictive.
Lemma 4.3. For any R ∈ E that is closed, set a¯ := sup{x ∈ R : x ≤ K}. Then, we have
R ∩ (0,K] = (0, a¯] ∈ E and J(x, (0, a¯]) ≥ J(x,R) for all x ∈ I.
Proof. Note that R ∩ (0,K] 6= ∅ must hold. If not, we would have J(x,R) = 0 < K − x = g(x) for
all 0 < x < K, a contradiction to R ∈ E . Hence, a¯ is well-defined with 0 < a¯ ≤ K.
To show R ∩ (0,K] = (0, a¯], assume to the contrary that there exists x ∈ (0, a¯) such that
x /∈ R. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.1, by considering p and q as in (4.3) and carrying out
the calculation as in (4.4), we get J(x,R) < K − x = g(x), a contradiction to R ∈ E .
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To show (0, a¯] ∈ E , it suffices to prove a¯ ≥ a∗, thanks to Proposition 4.1. Assume to the contrary
that a¯ < a∗. Consider b¯ := inf{x ∈ R : x > K} ≥ K. For any x ∈ (a¯, b¯), note that
E
P0
[
e−rTRg(Xx,r,σTR )
]
= EP0
[
e−rT
x,r,σ
a¯ g(a¯)1{Tx,r,σa¯ <T
x,r,σ
b¯
}
]
≤ EP0
[
e−rT
x,r,σ
a¯ g(a¯)
]
= EP0
[
e−rT(0,a¯]g(Xx,r,σT(0,a¯])
]
, ∀σ > 0. (4.11)
Hence, J(x,R) ≤ J(x, (0, a¯]) for all x ∈ (a¯, b¯). By Lemma 4.2 (ii), a¯ < a∗ implies that there exists
δ > 0 small enough such that J(x, (0, a¯]) = Λ(x, a¯) < (K − x)+ = g(x) for x ∈ (a¯, a¯+ δ). Thus, we
have J(x,R) ≤ J(x, (0, a¯]) < g(x) for x ∈ (a¯, a¯+ δ), a contradiction to R ∈ E .
To show the last assertion, note that if a¯ = K, it holds trivially that J(x,R) = J(x, (0, a¯]) for
all x ∈ I. Now, assume a¯ < K, and consider b¯ as above. Clearly, J(x,R) = J(x, (0, a¯]) for all
x ∈ I \ (a¯, b¯). For any x ∈ (a¯, b¯), by the same calculation as in (4.11), we get J(x,R) ≤ J(x, (0, a¯]).
We then conclude that J(x,R) ≤ J(x, (0, a¯]) for all x ∈ I.
Lemma 4.3 indicates that every closed equilibrium is dominated by another one contained in
(0,K]. Consequently, in terms of finding an optimal equilibrium, it is enough to focus on (0,K].
This, together with Proposition 4.1, immediately yields the following.
Theorem 4.1. Rˆ := (0, a∗], with a∗ defined in (4.7), is an optimal equilibrium.
Remark 4.1. If one views a∗ in (4.7) as a function in α ∈ [0, 1], it can be easily checked that a∗
is strictly increasing. That is, the larger α (i.e., the more ambiguity-averse), the larger the optimal
equilibrium (0, a∗]. Intuitively speaking, if an agent is rather ambiguity-averse (i.e., with a large α),
he has strong intention to withdraw from the ambiguous environment—by stopping, in our current
context. Hence, he prefers a large stopping threshold a∗, so that he can stop quickly once X drifts
only slightly below K > 0, which yields a positive (yet small) payoff K − a∗. On the other hand,
if an agent is rather ambiguity-loving (i.e., with a small α), he has strong intention to stay in the
ambiguous environment, to fully exploit the downward potential of X. Hence, he delays stopping
by choosing a small stopping threshold a∗.
Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.1 is consistent with the standard case without ambiguity. Indeed, when
there is no model ambiguity (i.e., σ = σ = σ), a∗ in (4.7) reduces to
a∗ =
2r/σ2
1 + 2r/σ2
K.
This is exactly the optimal stopping threshold for the classical problem
sup
τ∈T
E
P0 [e−rτ (K −Xx,r,στ )
+];
see e.g., Theorem 2.7.2 in Karatzas and Shreve (1998).
Estimating the riskfree rate r > 0 is essential to real options valuation. Our analysis can easily
accommodate additional uncertainty concerning the riskfree rate.
Remark 4.3. Suppose that the riskfree rate r > 0 is only known to lie in [r, r], for some given
constants 0 < r < r < ∞. By taking m1 :=
2r
σ2
and m2 :=
2r
σ2
in (4.7), all subsequent analysis still
holds, leading to a corresponding version of Theorem 4.1: (0, a∗] is an optimal equilibrium, where
a∗ is defined as in (4.7) with the updated m1 and m2.
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The analysis in this section can also be extended to some extend beyond the risk-neutral pricing
framework, to incorporate both drift and volatility uncertainty.
Remark 4.4. Suppose that the drift coefficient b in (4.1) is only known to lie in [b, b], for some
given constants 0 < b < b <∞. By taking
m1 :=
√
b
2
σ4
+
(2r − b)
σ2
+
1
4
+
b
σ2
−
1
2
and m2 :=
√
b2
σ4
+
(2r − b)
σ2
+
1
4
+
b
σ2
−
1
2
in (4.7), all subsequent analysis still holds, leading to a corresponding version of Theorem 4.1:
(0, a∗] is an optimal equilibrium, where a∗ is defined as in (4.7) with the updated m1 and m2.
5 A Generalized Measurable Projection Theorem
A measurable projection theorem typically involves the product of two measurable spaces, and
studies whether the projection of a measurable set in the product space is still measurable. Clas-
sical results, see e.g. Theorem 2.12 of Crauel (2002) or Theorem III.23 of Castaing and Valadier
(1977), all require one of the two spaces to be a Borel space endowed with the Borel σ-algebra.
As pointed out in Remark 2.2, this does not serve our needs in the proof of Lemma 2.2, where
Borel measurability is elusive. This section is devoted to establish a new, generalized measurable
projection theorem that accommodates any two general measurable spaces; see Theorem 5.1 below,
one of the major contributions of this paper.
Let us start with the notion of separated measurable spaces. Given a set M , a collection C of
subsets M is said to separate the points of M if for any distinct y1, y2 ∈M , there exists A ∈ C that
contains exactly one of y1 and y2. The next definition is taken from Section 8.6 of Cohn (1993).
Definition 5.1. A measurable space (M,A) is said to be separated if A separates the points of M ,
and countably generated if there exists {Ai}i∈N in A such that A = σ({Ai}i∈N).
Remark 5.1. If a measurable space (M,A) is countably generated, it can be shown that A sep-
arates the points of M if and only if {Ai}i∈N separates the points of M ; see e.g. Lemma III.24
of Castaing and Valadier (1977). Consequently, (M,A) being both separated and countably gener-
ated is the same as the notion “separability” defined in Definition III.24 of Castaing and Valadier
(1977).
The benefit of (M,A) being separated and countably generated is that it can be analyzed much
more easily—as if endowed with a Borel σ-algebra. This is stated precisely in the next result, taken
from Proposition III.25 of Castaing and Valadier (1977) and Corollary 8.6.4 of Cohn (1993).
Lemma 5.1. Let (M,A) be a separated and countably generated measurable space. Then, there
exists a subset K of {0, 1}N such that (M,A) is isomorphic to (K,B(K)).
On strength of Lemma 5.1, a generalized measurable projection theorem can be readily estab-
lished, for the special case where the two measurable spaces are separated and countably generated.
To state the result appropriately, let us introduce additional notation. Given a measurable
space (M,A), we denote by Aµ the augmentation of A by µ-null sets, for any finite measure µ on
(M,A). Let Aˆ be the universal completion of A, i.e.
Aˆ :=
⋂
{Aµ : µ is a finite measure on (M,A)}.
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Lemma 5.2. Let (M1,A1) and (M2,A2) be two measurable spaces that are separated and countably
generated. For any G ∈ A1 ⊗A2, its projection projM1(G) belongs to Aˆ1.
Proof. In view of Lemma 5.1, there exist isomorphisms i1 : (M1,A1) → (K1,B(K1)) and i2 :
(M2,A2) → (K2,B(K2)), for some K1, K2 ⊆ {0, 1}
N . If follows that there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between elements in A1⊗A2 and those in B(K1)⊗B(K2). Moreover, by Lemma III.26 of
Castaing and Valadier (1977), i1 is not only (A1,B(K1))-measurable, but (Aˆ1,G(K1))-measurable,
where G(K1) denotes the σ-algebra generated by analytic subsets of K1.
Now, suppose that G′ ∈ B(K1) ⊗ B(K2) corresponds to G ∈ A1 ⊗ A2. Then, projM1(G) =
i−11
(
projK1(G
′)
)
. By Proposition 7.39 of Bertsekas and Shreve (1978), projK1(G
′) is an analytic
subset of K1. It follows that i
−1
1
(
projK1(G
′)
)
∈ Aˆ1.
Extending Lemma 5.2 to accommodate any two arbitrary measurable spaces requires the fol-
lowing technical result.
Lemma 5.3. Let (M1,A1) and (M2,A2) be two measurable spaces. For any G ∈ A1 ⊗ A2, there
exist A ∈ A1 and a set-valued function Φ : A→ A2 such that
(i) G is the graph of Φ;
(ii) for any y, z ∈ A satisfying 1C(y) = 1C(z) for all C ∈ A1, we have Φ(y) = Φ(z).
Proof. Consider the collection
Γ := {G ∈ A1 ⊗A2 : ∃A ∈ A1 and Φ : A→ A2 such that (i) and (ii) hold}.
First, observe that Γ includes all sets of the form H = A× B, with A ∈ A1 and B ∈ A2. Indeed,
the constant set-valued function Φ(y) := B, for all y ∈ A, obviously has H as its graph and satisfies
(ii) in a trivial way. Now, we claim that Γ is a σ-algebra. As argued above, M1 ×M2 ∈ Γ. Next,
for any G ∈ Γ, take A ∈ A1 and Φ : A → A2 such that (i) and (ii) hold. Define the set-valued
function Ψ : M1 → A2 by
Ψ(y) :=
{
(Φ(y))c, if y ∈ A;
M2, if y ∈ A
c.
As Φ satisfies (ii), so does Ψ by definition. It can also be checked that the graph of Ψ is Gc. This
implies Gc ∈ Γ. Finally, for any {Gn}n∈N in Γ, take {An}n∈N in A1 and Φn : An → A2 such that
Gn is the graph of Φn and Φn satisfies (ii) for all n ∈ N. Let A :=
⋃
n∈NAn ∈ A1, and define the
set-valued function Ψ˜ : A→ A2 by
Ψ˜(y) :=
⋃
n∈N, y∈An
Φn(y), y ∈ A.
With Φn satisfying (ii) for all n ∈ N, Ψ˜ by definition also satisfies (ii). It can also be checked that
the graph of Ψ˜ is
⋃
n∈NGn. This implies
⋃
n∈NGn ∈ Γ. As Γ is a σ-algebra containing H = A×B
for all A ∈ A1 and B ∈ A2, we must have A1 ⊗A2 ⊆ Γ, which yields the desired result.
Now, we are ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.1. Let (M1,A1) and (M2,A2) be two measurable spaces. For any G ∈ A1 ⊗ A2, its
projection projM1(G) belongs to Aˆ1.
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Proof. Fix G ∈ A1 ⊗A2. Consider
Ci := {Ci ⊆ Ai : Ci is a countably generated σ-algebra}, i = 1, 2.
First, we claim that G ∈ C1 ⊗ C2 for some C1 ∈ C1 and C2 ∈ C2. Observe that
A1 ⊗A2 =
⋃
{C1 ⊗ C2 : C1 ∈ C1, C2 ∈ C2}. (5.1)
Indeed, as the right hand side of (5.1) is a σ-algebra and it contains all sets of the form H = A×B
with A ∈ A1 and B ∈ A2 (this is because H ∈ C1 ⊗ C2, for any C1 ∈ C1 that contains A and any
C2 ∈ C2 that contains B), we obtain the “⊆” relation in (5.1). Because the “⊇” relation is trivial,
(5.1) is established. Our claim is therefore proved.
Define an equivalence relation on M1 as follows: for any y, z ∈M1,
y ∼ z if and only if 1C(y) = 1C(z) for all C ∈ C1. (5.2)
Set M ′1 := M1/ ∼, the quotient space induced by ∼, and define ϕ1 :M1 →M
′
1 by
ϕ1(y) = [y] := {z ∈M1 : z ∼ y}, ∀y ∈M1. (5.3)
One can deduce from (5.2) and (5.3) that for any C1, C2 ∈ C1,
ϕ1(C1) 6= ϕ1(C2) if C1 6= C2 and ϕ1(C1) ∩ ϕ1(C2) = ∅ if C1 ∩ C2 = ∅.
Let us check that C′1 := ϕ1(C1) is a σ-algebra on M
′
1. First, ∅ = ϕ1(∅) ∈ C
′
1. Also, for any {C
′
i}i∈N
in C′1, there exist {Ci}i∈N in C1 such that C
′
i = ϕ1(Ci) for all i ∈ N. Consequently, (i)
⋃
i∈NC
′
i =⋃
i∈N ϕ1(Ci) = ϕ1(
⋃
i∈NCi) ∈ C
′
1, where the second equality follows from the definition of ϕ1; (ii)
Because ϕ1(C1)∪ϕ1(C
c
1) =M
′
1 and ϕ1(C1)∩ϕ1(C
c
1) = ∅, we have (C
′
1)
c = (ϕ1(C1))
c = ϕ1(C
c
1) ∈ C
′
1.
Hence, we conclude that C′1 is a σ-algebra.
Because ϕ1 : M1 → M
′
1 is a surjection and C1 is countably generated, C
′
1 = ϕ1(C1) is again
countably generated. Also, for any distinct [y], [z] ∈ M ′1, there exists C ∈ C1 such that y ∈ C but
z /∈ C; that is, ϕ1(C) ∈ C
′
1 contains [y], but not [z]. This shows that C
′
1 separates the points of M
′
1.
Therefore, the measure space (M ′1, C
′
1) is separated and countably generated.
In a similar fashion, we can define an equivalence relation on M2 as in (5.2), with C1 replaced
by C2. Then, ϕ2 : M2 → M
′
2 can be introduced as in (5.3), with M1 and M
′
1 replaced by M2 and
M ′2 := M2/ ∼. The same argument above implies that (M
′
2, C
′
2), with C
′
2 := ϕ2(C2), is separated
and countably generated.
Recall that G ∈ C1 ⊗ C2. By Lemma 5.3, there exist C
∗ ∈ C1 and a set-valued function
Φ : C∗ → C2, such that G is the graph of Φ and Φ(y) = Φ(z) whenever y ∼ z. Note that Φ can be
extended to the entire space M1 by setting Φ(y) = ∅ for y /∈ C
∗. Define ψ1 : M
′
1 → M1 as follows:
for any [y] ∈ M ′1, let ψ1([y]) := z for some z ∈ M1 with z ∼ y. Then, we deduce from (5.2) that
for any C ∈ C1, ψ
−1
1 (C) = ϕ1(C) ∈ C
′
1; that is, ψ1 is (C
′
1, C1)-measurable. Define ψ2 : M
′
2 → M2
in the same manner: for any [y] ∈ M ′2, let ψ2([y]) := z for some z ∈ M2 with z ∼ y. Similarly,
ψ2 is (C
′
2, C2)-measurable. Now, by considering ϕ2 as a function from C2 to C
′
2, we introduce the
set-valued function Ψ from M ′1 to C
′
2:
Ψ([y]) := ϕ2 (Φ(ψ1([y]))) ∈ C
′
2, ∀[y] ∈M
′
1.
Let H denote the graph of Ψ. Observe that
H = {([y], [z]) ∈M ′1 ×M
′
2 : [z] ∈ Ψ([y])}
= {([y], [z]) ∈M ′1 ×M
′
2 : ψ2([z]) ∈ Φ(ψ1([y]))}
= {([y], [z]) ∈M ′1 ×M
′
2 : (ψ1([y]), ψ2([z])) ∈ G}
= (ψ1 × ψ2)
−1(G) ∈ C′1 ⊗ C
′
2,
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where the second equality is deduced from (5.2), with C1 replaced by C2. By Lemma 5.2, this implies
projM ′1(H) ∈ Cˆ
′
1. Thanks to Lemma III.26 of Castaing and Valadier (1977), ϕ1 is not only (C1, C
′
1)-
measurable, but (Cˆ1, Cˆ
′
1)-measurable. Hence, projM1(G) = ϕ
−1
1
(
projM ′1(H)
)
∈ Cˆ1 ⊆ Aˆ1.
A Proof of Lemma 3.3
Fix x ∈ I. Consider
p := sup{y ∈ R0 : y < x} and q := inf{y ∈ R0 : y > x},
where we take p = ℓ (resp. q = r) if there is no y < x (resp. y > x) lying in R0. Similarly, define
pn := sup{y ∈ Rn : y < x} and qn := inf{y ∈ Rn : y > x}, ∀n ∈ N.
As R0 =
⋃
n∈NRn and {Rn}n∈N is nondecreasing, we have pn ↑ p and qn ↓ q.
Proof of (3.9). On the set {ρ0 = ∞}, ρn = ρ0 = ∞ for all n ∈ N, and thus (3.9) trivially holds.
On the set {ρ0 <∞}, Bρ0 = p or q. We assume Bρ0 = p without loss of generality. If p ∈ R0, then
p ∈ Rn for all n large enough. Consequently, ρ
n = ρ0 for all n large enough. If p /∈ R0, then B
has to enter the region (ℓ, p) immediately after ρ0. As pn ↑ p, this implies ρ
n ↓ ρ0. Thus, (3.9) is
established.
Proof of (3.10). Fix ε > 0. First, note that if pn = p and qn = q for n large enough, then ρ
n = ρ0
on Ωx for all n large enough, whence (3.10) follows trivially. It remains to deal with the case where
(i) pn is strictly increasing, or (ii) qn is strictly decreasing.
For any n ∈ N, define An := {ω ∈ Ω
x : |ρn − ρ0| ≥ ε}. By (3.9), (An)n∈N is nonincreasing and⋂
n∈NAn = ∅. For the case where (i) and (ii) both hold, observe that An \ An ⊆ Fn, where
Fn := {ω ∈ Ω
x : ρ0 <∞, Bt ∈ [pn, qn] ∀t ∈ (ρ
0, ρ0 + ε),
∃s ∈ (ρ0, ρ0 + ε) s.t. Bs = pn or qn}, ∀n ∈ N.
By the definition of Fn, we have
P
x
b,σ(Fn) = P0
(
(Xx,b,σt )t≥0 ∈ Fn
)
= 0, ∀(b, σ) ∈ Π(x). (A.1)
Indeed, as {(Xx,b,σt )t≥0 ∈ Fn} consists of sample paths such that T
pn
(ℓ,pn)
> 0 or T q
n
(qn,r)
> 0, it must
be a P0-null set in view of Remark 3.1. Moreover, Fn ∩ Fm = ∅ for all n < m, as pn is strictly
increasing and qn is strictly decreasing. It follows that⋂
n∈N
An ⊆
⋂
n∈N
(An ∪ Fn) =
⋂
n∈N
An = ∅. (A.2)
By Lemma 7 in Denis et al. (2011), as P(x) is relatively compact (Lemma 3.2), for every sequence
of closed set Cn ↓ ∅ we have supP∈P(x) P(Cn) ↓ 0. Hence, by (A.1) and (A.2),
sup
P∈P(x)
P(An) = sup
P∈P(x)
P(An) ↓ 0, (A.3)
which is exactly (3.10).
23
Now, for the case where only one of (i) and (ii) holds, we assume without loss of generality that
(i) holds. Let Ap,qn denote the set An in the previous case where both (i) and (ii) hold, and A
p
n
denote the set An in the current case where only (i) holds. Note that A
p,q
n = A
p,q,1
n ∪A
p,q,2
n , where
Ap,q,1n := {ω ∈ Ω
x : Bρ0 = p, |ρ
n − ρ0| ≥ ε}, Ap,q,2n := {ω ∈ Ω
x : Bρ0 = q, |ρ
n − ρ0| ≥ ε}.
Observing that Apn = A
p,q,1
n , we obtain in the current case
sup
P∈P(x)
P(|ρn − ρ0| ≥ ε) = sup
P∈P(x)
P(Ap,q,1n ) ≤ sup
P∈P(x)
P(Ap,qn ) ↓ 0,
where the convergence was established in (A.3). That is, (3.10) remains valid.
Proof of (3.11). Fix 0 < ε < q − p. First, note that if pn = p and qn = q for n large enough, then
ρn = ρ0 on Ωx for all n large enough, whence (3.11) follows trivially. It remains to deal with the
case where (i) pn is strictly increasing, or (ii) qn is strictly decreasing.
For any n ∈ N, define An := {ω ∈ Ω
x : |Bρn − Bρ0 |1{ρn<∞} ≥ ε}. By (3.9), (An)n∈N is
nonincreasing for n large enough and
⋂
n∈NAn = ∅. We first deal with the case where (i) and (ii)
both hold. For n large enough such that max{|pn − p|, |qn − q|} < ε, observe that An \An ⊆ Fn :=
F 1n ∪ F
2
n , where
F 1n := {ω ∈ Ω
x : Bρ0 = q, Bt ≤ qn ∀t ∈ (ρ
0, ρ{pn}), ∃s ∈ (ρ
0, ρ{pn}) s.t. Bs = qn},
F 2n := {ω ∈ Ω
x : Bρ0 = p, Bt ≥ pn ∀t ∈ (ρ
0, ρ{qn}), ∃s ∈ (ρ
0, ρ{qn}) s.t. Bs = pn}.
Note that (A.1) holds in the current context, by the same argument below (A.1). Also, by the
definitions of F 1n and F
2
n , Fn ∩ Fm = ∅ for all n < m, as pn is strictly increasing and qn is strictly
decreasing. It follows that (A.2) is still true. Hence, by using Lemma 7 in Denis et al. (2011) again,
we obtain (A.3), which is exactly (3.11).
For the case where only one of (i) and (ii) holds, we can follow the same argument in the last
part of the proof of (3.10) to conclude that (3.11) remains valid.
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